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Abstract
There are three major categories upon which all of  the world’s civilizations
are established, namely, God, Man and World. The differentiation of
worldly civilizations and the diversity of systems of knowledge are due to
the way of  drawing up the relation thereby the three categories are arranged.
Some scholars assumed that these categories are communicated and totally
correlated each other, in a way that each cannot be realized except in its
connectivity to the others. While some others thought that the three categories
should be separated and disconnected, in a way that each of the three is
realized as an absolute and dominant one while the two others are marginal
and dependent ones.
        Needless to say, while the first perception provokes the values of
tolerance and the acceptance of the other, the second one motivates absolutism
and the negation of the other. Unfortunately the Ash’arism, not only a
dogma but —and more importantly— a stable and dominant way of
thinking, is stimulated by the second perception based on an absolutism
and the negation of the other. It departs from that historical fact that this
paper argues that absolutism, manifested in political, religious and cultural
aspects of nowadays Muslims life, can be related to the dominance of
Ash’arism all over the Muslim world.
Keywords: Ash’arite dogma, absolutism, Muslim theology
–––––––––––––––––
1 I am very grateful for Abdulkader Rayadi for editing this article.
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A. Introduction
Absolutism is the real substance of the Arab (or perhaps Muslim)
politics in the modern era.  It is the very root that feeds all despotic
and authoritarian practices, which prevail in the political domains of
the Arabs and Muslims.  The serious dilemma is that, the Arabs/Muslims
are now under the tremendous pressure from the outside world –notably
from the superpower- to rehabilitate their political order through the
implementation of  democracy and respect for human rights.  The
driving reason behind this demand is the urgent need to drain the
sources of what some have –mistakenly or rightly- called Islamic
terrorism.  Apart from the true intention of  this demand, reformation
and change in the Arab/Muslim world become nonetheless the interests
of  the outside power.
At this juncture, the Arab/Muslim world is trapped between two
things; between the pressure for change and reform, and between the
incapability to overcome its inherent predicament that hinders its
aspiration for political shift.  Thus, it is awkwardly suffering from falling
between the horns of  the two dilemmas.
Attempts have been made to get away from the Arab/Muslim
decadence, but these have come to a meaningless outcome.  This failure
might be caused by the fact that these attempts followed the strategy
of replacing an old practice with a modern one, without considering
the discourse that stands behind this practice and dictates it.  The
suggested Western recipe of  reformation for the Middle East adopts
this strategy.  It looks at the impasse of  the Arab reality merely in its
outward political representation, and ignores its deep cultural root,
which found its most flashy projection in absolutism.  Absolutism of
this kind however, cannot be uplifted by means of  the Western recipes
only.  Delving into a classical Muslim legacy is necessary; a legacy that
still strongly dominates people’s consciousness –ruling and ruled- with
its evasive systems and hidden roots that perpetuate absolutism.
Applying a Western democratic recipe without looking at this classical
legacy is destined to another failure because this will merely replace an
old practice with a new one, holding the absolutist discourse constantly
alive.  This new practice will surely be absorbed –as past events
witnessed- within the structure of  the dominant discourse to the extent
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that it will become a decorative mask through which this discourse
extends its life.
The intention of this essay is to initiate a serious step towards a
critical investigation of  the discourse of  absolutism.  The essay suggests
that this discourse finds its most profound roots in the dogmatic system
of  the Ash’arites.  Taking for granted that this system is not only
theological, the thesis argues that it was vulnerably usable for ideological
and political purposes.  The analysis particularly focuses on tracing the
deep structure of  the Ash’arite system that regulates some specific
issues in a hope to touch some of  its ideological functions.
B. The Structural Formulation of  the Asha’rite Dogma
The entry to the formulation of  the Ash’arite system relies
principally in understanding the Ash’arite perception of the concept
of the relationship between the three circles of existence, namely God,
man and the world.  The differences between all intellectual and
civilizational systems are in fact, due to their perception of this
relationship.  In terms of  the Ash’arite formulation of  this relationship,
it is characterized by its abstract and formal form.  In this formulation,
a concretization of one circle is deemed possible without any
consideration to the other two circles, simply because it is impossible
to formulate a creative relationship between the three circles –
themselves formal- in the light of  what is abstract and formal.  On
that basis, the Ash’arites negate the idea of the relationship between
the three circle due to the difference and contrast between them that
goes beyond any formal and abstract intellectual construct.  To say
the least, the Ash’arites came to the conclusion –by virtue of this
formality and abstraction- that the only possible relationship between
them is a “dictating and subjugating relationship” and not “interactive
and assimilative one”.2
–––––––––––––––––
2 The concept of relationship differs in accordance to the difference of the
logical domain within which relationship is dealt with.  With regard to the formal logic,
the concept of relationship does not acquire any meaning or essential significance.  The
reason being that substance –as a foundation for any relationship- differs from all
categories and accidents, which do not exist except through being its qualities.  Therefore,
the essence of the possible relationship between substance and categories is the
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In any case, the true relationship (true in the sense that it is
necessary and not superficial) between any elements that can influence
one another, has no place whatsoever in the Ash’arite system of thought.
In truth, it is not easy to explain the Ash’arites’ system of  thought in
the absence of a clear understanding of their negation of this
relationship –as a necessary connection- between God, man and the
world.
Concomitant to their negation of this relationship is their
intention to widely open the domain of the “dominance of the
absolutes”.3  The aim of their system of thought and the cause of its
formulation were principally to exhibit the dominance of  the divine
absolute at the expense of both man and the world.  That is why their
system was crystallized as a complete reiteration of the concept of
God, to the extent that the world seems to be void of anything but
God.  This resulted in the dislodging of the objectivity and necessity
of the world and the activity of man.  Hence, for the Ash’arite, the
world and man are empty and fragile existence without value.
Accordingly, the true existence of  God necessitates the marginality of
any other existence.
–––––––––––––––––
dominance of the former over the latter and the subjugation of substance over all
categories.  On the other hand, in the domain of the dialectic logic, accidents become the
forms of substance or the manifestations of existence that appear out of substance.
And although substance may pose itself as an accident, the truth is that it simply puts
another substance because what emerges out of it, is itself.  In other words, that which
substance poses as an accident is in fact another substance.  See, Walter Stace, Falsafah
Hegel, trans. by Ima>m ‘Abdul Fatta>h} Ima>m (Cairo: Da>r al-Thaqa>fah li al-T}iba>‘ah wa al-
Nashr, 1980).  From here, the possible relationship becomes the interactive relationship
between two substances within which one substance is determined by the other.
Accordingly, all despotic systems of  thought –be they are civilizational or religious- are
crystallized through first of all, an abstract perception about the relationship between
the three circles of existence, while all tolerant systems of thought are in contrast
crystallized through a dialectic perception of  that relationship.
3 Although the Ash’arites were interested only in showing that in the face of
the dominance of the divine absolute, an objective existence of the world and an active
existence of man collapse, this presupposition leads -intentionally or unintentionally-
to the magnification of the dominance of the political absolute in a world where there
is no longer true existence except for an “absolute” Lord or ruler.  That is why the
Ash’arism remained forever –from its very inception- the winning doctrine of the
authority.
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It might have been understood from that brief description that
the sacrifice of the objectivity of the world and the activity of man for
the sake of the dominance of the divine absolute, is the most passive
results that the Ash’arite system of thought has ever produced.
Fortunately, this result is in a collision with one of  God’s purposes of
creation.  God has never created the world and man to institutionalize
His dominance, but to constitute the knowledge of Himself, as He
Himself  states.4  The knowledge of  Himself  –and not the dominance
over the other- is the real content of the relationship between God,
man and the world.  And that is what the Ash’arites could not realize
due to their prevailing perception of the absolute dominance of God
over man and the natural world.
This absolutist structure, whose aim is to emphasize the
dominance of the (divine or political) absolute, becomes even more
apparent when the elements of the Ash’arite system of thought are
structurally analyzed.  The structure of  this system –it is important to
note- is not discoverable only through the “realization of its external
and sensitive relationships”;5 a relationship that merely verifies the
affinity between the elements of the system, but through the disclosure
of  the internal rational system that regulates all its elements.
Interestingly however, although the disclosure of this internal system
-the structure that is- cannot be verified except through the elements
of the system, these elements in their turn cannot be explained except
through their affiliation to this structure.6  Putting this in mind, the
–––––––––––––––––
4 God says in the Hadi>th Qudsi>, “I was a hidden treasure, and I want to be
known, then I created the creatures by which I was known”.  From this Hadi>th, it seems
that He was hidden not only from others but also from Himself, because by then there
was no one that He can be hidden from.  In other words, this “treasure” is hidden from
an essence which knew -from eternity- the necessity of the other to display its creative
presence, and not from other which has no existence yet.  Thus, God might not only
will to be known by the other, but also to know His own true essence through the
other.
5 Zakariyya> Ibra>hi>m, Mushkilat al-Binyah, (Cairo: Da>r Nahd}ah Misr, nd), p. 33.
6 This does not mean at all that this structure is a priori existence, which comes
before the elements of the system.  Just as the elements realize the structure, so also the
structure realizes the elements.  Thus, dialectism, and not a priorism, is the content of
the relationship between structure and its elements.
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absolutist structure of  the Ash’arite system is not merely a product of
a simple realization of the superficial relationship that joins the
elements of the system, because it is the internal rational system that
regulates this relationship and acquires for it its rationality and
interpretation.  In other words, a simple observation of  the external
affinities between various issues that the Ash’arites have dealt with,
notably the issues of God, man and nature, will not lead to the
disclosure of  the structure of  Ash’arite system.  What will lead to this
is an internal rational system that these issues essentially revolve around.
It is here –and only here- that the structure of  the Ash’arite system
can be disclosed.
 C. The Internal System of  the Dogma
A serious analysis of the Ash’arite dogma reveals an internal
cohesion between God, world, and human; a cohesion, which crosses
beyond the mere external and fragile connection between these three
elements of  existence to the inner and deep structure of  the system.
Around this structure these elements revolve and acquire their
rationality and interpretation.  When one goes beyond the particularity
of understanding to the totality of interpretation7, he would realize an
internal system which regulates the various particular elements of the
Asha’rite dogma.  This internal system is the structure that cannot be
realized away from these elements.  To understand it, a serious analysis
of issues such as divine attributes, natural and human world must be
carried out.  An analysis such as this can certainly lead to the revelation
of  the profound structure of  the Asha’rite system that these issues
revolve around.  While the absolutist feature of  this structure can in
fact be easily seen, the structural analysis of  these issues will further
show emphatically that above-mentioned feature is indeed absolutist.
–––––––––––––––––
7 By understanding we mean a rational process based on the most precise
description of the structure of single issue like divine attributes for example, and by
interpretation we mean a process aims at joining a specific single structure, which is a
part to another comprehensive structure, which is a whole.  For more details on this
meaning of  understanding and interpretation see Lucian Goldman, ‘Ilm Ijtima> al-A<da>b,
trans. by Ja>bir Usfu>r (Majallah Fusu>l, vol I, edition 2, January 1981), pp. 104-5.
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To begin with, the Ash’arites affirmed that divine attributes are
eternal (qadi>mah) and augmented (za>’idah) to the divine essence.  The
ground for this premise is that it is impossible for a being, which lacks
knowledge, power, hearing, and sight to be a creator and director
(mudabbir) of the world.8  That is why it is said that, “whomsoever
does not have these attributes has indeed the opposite ones, and these
opposite ones are defects and shortcomings that preclude the perfection
of action”.9  Thus, “the name of Allah cannot be applied to an essence
that has been emptied from divine attributes”.10  On that note, to negate
attributes means to negate essence.  And in this way, it becomes
necessary that “God has undeniable attributes to which His divine
acts signify.  In the same way that His divine acts signify Him being
Knowing, Powerful and Willing, they also signify Knowledge, Power
and Will (as His attributes) because there is no difference as regard to
the connotation of His acts in the phenomenal world (sha>hid) and the
noumenal world (gha>’ib)”.11  In a nutshell, an attribution requires
attribute in the same way that an attribute requires attribution.12
In truth, the affirmation of  divine attributes as eternal and
augmented to the divine essence is necessarily linked to the absolutist
structure of  the Ash’arite system.  Investigating the divine attributes,
the Ash’arites gave way to the inquiry of the natural and human issues
as related directly to the affirmation of  the attributes as both eternal
–––––––––––––––––
8 Abu> al-H{usayn al-Asfra’i>ni>, al-Tabsi>r fi> al-Di>n, edited Sayyid ‘Izzat al-H{usayn
(Cairo: Mat\ba’ah al-Anwa>r, 1940), p. 37.
9 Ibid., p. 99
10 Abu> H{a>mid al-Ghazza>li>, al-Iqtis}a>d fi> al-I’tiqa>d, (Cairo: Maktabah al-H{alabi>, nd),
p. 70.
11 Al-Ash‘ari>, Maqa>la>t al-Isla>miyyi>n, vol I, p. 128.  Cited from Ali> Sa>mi> al-Nassha>r,
Nash’at al-Fikr al-Falsafi>, (Cairo: Da>r al-Ma’a>rif, vol I, 1977), p. 431.  It seems that the
“analogy of the noumena on the phenomena” is what the proponents of the attributes
of God depend their argument upon.  That is to say “if it is seen that knowing being
is knowing because of his knowledge, then it follows that the unseen Knowing (God)
is also Knowing because of His knowledge.  On this basis the proponents of the
attributes of God affirm will and speech as attributes of God.  See al-Juwayni>, al-
Burha>n, vol 2, part 3.  Cited from Ali> Sa>mi> al-Nassha>r, Mana>hij al-Bah}th ‘Inda Mufakkiri>
al-Isla>m (Cairo: Da>r al-Ma’a>rif, 1978), p. 108.
12 Al-Juwayni>, al-Burha>n.  Cited from al-Nassha>r, Mana>hij al-Bah}th, p. 108.
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and augmented.  In all this, the Ash’arite construction of  the attributes
is based on what seems to be a particular perception concerning human
and natural world as an empty and fragile existence completely
submissive to the absolute and unrealizable will and power of God.
This means that –in the Ash’arite system- the efficacy and positivity
of the divine attributes cannot be achieved except in their encounter
with the natural and human world which is passive and inactive.
Furthermore, the absolutist structure of  the Asha’rite system
may be shown as manifested most clearly in the issue of the divine
attributes and attribution, especially when the (Ash’arite) perception
concerning the relationship between the attribution and attribute is
compared to the Mu’tazilite perception of the same issue.  The attribute
according to the Asha’rites, is “something present in that which has an
attribute (mausu>f) and which acquires for it –that is mausu>f- the
attribution.13  Attribution in the meantime is a “saying of an attributer
(man) that God is Knowing, Living, Powerful, and Beneficent.  This
attribution is not the attribute of God, which is the cause of Him
being Knowing, Powerful, and Willing”.14  Here, attribute is a priori
and objective entity immanent within the divine essence and is anterior
to the attribution.  This means that attribute is distinguishable from
attribution, which follows the attribute and the saying of the attributer
(man) as well.  As a result, attribute according to the Asha’rites is
immanent entity within the divine essence, and at the same time it is
independent from any creation or action.  It is absolute regardless of
its activity.15  Taking this into account, it is possible to say that, “the
power of  God exists in eternity, while He does nothing with it”.16  And
since the attribution springs from the attribute, which is eternal and
immanent within the divine essence,17 the attribution carries a posterior
characteristic while the attribute an anterior one.  All this reveals that
–––––––––––––––––
13 Abu> Bakr al-Baqilla>ni>, al-Tamhi>d, edited by Yu>suf  Makarthi> (Beirut: al-
Maktabah al-Ka>tu>li>kiyyah, 1957), p. 213.
14 Ibid., p. 214.
15 It becomes clear that attribute –described in this way- is identical to what is
known as the “Platonic ideals”.
16 Al-Baqilla>ni>, al-Tamhi>d, p. 35.
17 Ibid., p. 213.
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the attribution is marginal and subsidiary in the Asha’rite system.  To
remember this is always important so as to know the absolutist structure
of this system.  The attribution forever requires the presence of the
“other”, which is very essential in the process of that attribution, since
it is this process that assumes whether the “other” describes himself
to the “essence”, or that the “essence” describes itself to the “other”.18
Thus, the Asha’rite perception of  the attribution -which necessitates
the presence of the other- as posterior to the attribute, which is imma-
nent within the divine essence reflects the posteriority and marginality
of the other, who in this context is man.  This directly means that it is
possible within Ash’arism to eliminate man from a system, and at the
same time to accentuate the dominance of the divine essence; an
essence that does not exercise its activity except in an absolute way.
Speaking in a broad generality, those who tried to formulate a
more balanced and dialectic relationship between the three elements
of existence (God, man, and the world) have realized that the Ash’arite
absolute perception of the divine essence and its attributes gives rise
to the apparent difficulties concerning the content of the divine essence
and some of the essential issues of belief.
The Ash’arite slogan that God for example “knows things before
their existence as what they are after their existence in particular time
and space and so forth,19 with His eternal and augmented knowledge
results necessarily in the assumption of  some kind of  change in God’s
essence, which is undoubtedly related to the change of His knowledge
immanent within that essence.  It is indeed difficult “to imagine that
–––––––––––––––––
18 This is true except if one is saying that the divine essence in eternity describes
itself for itself.  But this contradicts –it seems- with what has been said about the
essence that it is in eternity is a “hidden treasure”, who created creations to be known.
On the other hand, if  Ibn ‘Abba>d al-Mu’tazili> -for fear of  being accused of  polytheism-
has asserted that “God cannot be said to have known Himself in eternity because that
will lead to the distinction between the Knowing and the Known (ma‘lu>m)” see Abdul
Kari>m al-Shahrasta>ni>, al-Milal wa al-Nih}al, ed. by ‘Abdul ‘Azi>z al-Waki>l, (Cairo: Mu’assasat
al-H{alabi>,  1968), vol I, p. 68, then it cannot be similarly said that: God described
Himself in eternity because that will lead to the distinction between the attributer and
the attributed.
19 Abu> al-Wali>d ibn Rushd, Fas}l al-Maqa>l Fi>ma> Bayna al-H{ikmah wa al-Shari>’ah min
al-Ittis}a>l, (Beirut: Da>r al-Ilm li’l-Jami>’, 1935), p. 37.
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knowledge of thing before its existence is the very same knowledge
after its existence”.20  This is because the existence of things after
being non-existent means that a change has taken place, which is
manifested in the “movement of thing from its non-existence to
existence, or from potentiality to actuality”.21  Since “knowledge must
follow an existent, and an existent is sometime potential and sometime
actual, knowledge of potential existent and actual existent must be
different”.22  In this whole process, a change in knowledge has taken
place and should necessarily be applied to the divine essence.  Some in
fact like al-Jahm Ibn Safwa>n has recognized that change of the divine
essence as the result of  the affirmation of  knowledge as its eternal
attribute, is a matter of  necessity.  Seeking to maintain that the divine
essence is unchangeable, al-Jahm holds that “it is not permissible that
God knows thing before its creation because that would mean inevitably
that His knowledge of thing prior to its creation would either remain
or not.  It is not possible that it remains because after the thing is
actually created, God’s knowledge that He will create it cannot remain.
That is due to the fact that God’s knowledge after the creation of
thing is by necessity not His knowledge before its creation, otherwise
His knowledge would turn into ignorance.  And that is impossible to
Him, the All-knowing.  On the other hand, if  His knowledge that He
will create thing did not remain after its actual creation, then the
knowledge would have changed and change is impossible for Him”.23
All this encourages al-Jahm to believe that “God’s knowledge is as
contingent as His creatures”.24
–––––––––––––––––
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibn Rushd, al-Kashf ‘an Mana>hij al-Adillah fi> Aqa>’id al-Millah, (Beirut: Da>r al-
Ilm li’l-Jami>, 1935), pp. 77-8.
23 Al-Shahrasta>ni>, al-Milal, vol. I, p. 87.
24 Ibid., p. 87.  It seems that the insistence of  al-Jahm to take further his view
about the contingency of  God’s knowledge into the view of  His divine essence as an
abode of contingencies and change, is the one that leads him into believing that His
knowledge is contingent out of  –and not in- His essence.  See Ibid., p. 87.  But the fact
remains –and this is important- that His knowledge -according to al-Jahm- is no longer
a priori thing.  It is rather a contingent thing, which continuously changes because events
change.  And as His knowledge is related to events in this way, that in turn belittles –to
a great extent- His absolutist character.
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In addition, the affirmation of  God’s knowledge as eternal and
at the same time augmented (to the divine essence) necessitates that
“God eternally knows a man who did not –and will not- exist, and
knows believers who have never existed and non-believers who are
not yet created”.25  God knows eternally what His creatures will do,
and He is eternally “monitoring the hidden depth of their heart, the
movement of their soul and the secrets of their mysteries with His
eternal knowledge that He is attributed with since eternal eternity, and
not with an impermanent knowledge, which is imbued in His divine
essence by means of  change and transformation”.26
So, it might have become clear from here that human beings
were known (by God) either as believers or non-believers before they
were created.27  That is to say that, “human beings are known by His
attribute (i.e., knowledge) before their existence that they will be either
in hellfire or in paradise”.28  Human beings do nothing except that
which God has predetermined eternally by His knowledge that they
will do.  Consequently, human acts became nothing but a monotonous
repetition -for what God knows eternally- void of creativity and
innovation.  Taking this into mind, it would then become strange that
God punishes or rewards human beings for the acts that He imposes
upon them according to His eternal knowledge.  Hisha>m Ibn al-Hakam
comments that “if God eternally knows what human beings are going
to do, then the notion of  human responsibility will become
meaningless”.29
–––––––––––––––––
25 Abu> al-H{asan al-Ash’ari>, Maqa>la>t al-Islamiyyi>n, ed. by Muhammad Muh}yiddi>n
‘Abdul H{ami>d, (Cairo: Maktabah al-Nahd}ah al-Misriyyah, 1950), vol I, p. 223.
26 Ah}mad Mah}mu>d S}ubh}i>, Fi> Ilm al-Kala>m, (Alexandria: Mu’assasah al-Ja>mi’iyyah,
1982), vol II, p. 148.
27 Umar al-Khayya>m has recognized the impasse that this view contains
manifested in the clear contradiction between the eternal knowledge of human acts
(especially when these acts are caused by His knowledge) on the one hand, and between
human accountability, reward and punishment on the other.  Khayyam says: “God
knows before my creation that I will drink wine and not be able to give it up.  And if  I
prevent myself  from it, God’s a priori knowledge about me then turns to be an
ignorance”
28 Al-Ash’ari>, Maqa>la>t, p. 223.
29 Ibid., p. 108.
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From here the Mu’tazilaites maintained that human acts should
necessarily be taken beyond the divine knowledge, which is a priori in
the eternity so as not to sabotage His divine justice.  Accordingly, it is
impossible in line with this argument that “human being is considered
a believer or infidel before his creation and even after it as well”.30
Thus, the divine knowledge is linked to the human acts (as a pure
creation of  man), while human acts as a man’s acquisition is not linked
to the a priori divine knowledge.  To put it differently, human activities
are the most important condition for the knowledge of his own essence
whether he is a believer or non-believer.  So, the view that there is an
eternal knowledge transcending any human activity, which is to do
with the idea of, “the believers and the non-believers who have not
yet been created”, is -on the one side of the coin- in agreement with
the absolutist tendency, but on the other it is also in apparent
contradiction with His divine justice.  Naturally, the affirmation of
God’s attributes as absolute and out of  any limitation leads to the
“incompatibility of those various divine attributes in their relation to
one another”.31
Be that as it may, the Ash’arite perception of  the attributes as
absolute and out of any limitation ended up in some kind of confusion
and contradiction.  For example, the affirmation of  knowledge as an
eternal and absolute attribute gives rise to the necessity of assuming a
type of change which takes place within the divine essence as a result
of the change of knowledge immanent within it.  Moreover, the
proposition that the eternity of divine knowledge concerning what
human beings are going to do, is at odds with the divine justice.  Bearing
this in mind, the absolutist Ash’arite system can be seen as transgressing
firstly, the divine essence –assuming its change- and secondly, the divine
attributes -assuming its contradiction.
While the Ash’arite perception of the divine attributes as absolute
and out of limitation can be seen as transgressing both the divine essence
and divine attributes, it can also be seen as having based itself upon a
–––––––––––––––––
30 Ibid., p. 223.
31 Hassan Hanafi>, Dira>sa>t Isla>miyyah (Cairo: Maktabah al-Anglo al-Misriyyah,
1981), p. 51.
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severe infraction of the real nature of both the world and human.32
This becomes apparent when the attribute of divine power is subjected
to an analysis.  The absolutization of  this attribute paved the way for
the negation or/and at least the fettering of human effectiveness, while
on the other hand caused the breaking down of the objectivity of the
natural world and the uniformity of  its laws.
This point is so important that to put it in a different way is
worthwhile.  The assumption that God’s power is absolute and is out
of any limitation is the one that obliged the Ash’arites to negate human
creativity.  God’s power, according to them, is “an eternal attribute
immanent within the divine essence, united without multitude, and
related to all things subjected to it (maqdu>ra>t)”.33  These maqdu>ra>t
furthermore, are referred to as “all possible things (mumkin) which have
no end”.34  Thus, God’s power extends to include the whole possible
things of the world to the extent that, “any movement in the cosmos
cannot be indicated at except in manner that it is a subject of that
power”.35  Human actions, in this way, are classified within these
possible things subjected to the absolute power of God.  The reason
being that, as al-Ghazza>li> says “there is a strong evidence that every
possible being is a subject to God’s power.  Every contingent is possible,
and human action is contingent, so it is possible.  If it is not related to
God’s power, then it is no longer possible”.36  From here “Abu> al-H{asan
al-Asha’ri> claimed” as al-Ra>zi> reported “that there is no any effect of
human capacity in his action.  Both human capacity and his action are
from God”.37 Thus, the negation of human creativity and his capacity38
–––––––––––––––––
32 It seems accordingly, that the transgression against the world and human
leads undoubtedly to the transgression of God, which means that belittling the world
implies belittling God in the same way that ruining human being implies ruining God.
33 Al-A<midi>, Gha>yat al-Mura>m fi> ‘Ilm al-Kala>m, edited by H{asan Mah}mu>d ‘Abdul
Lati>f  (Cairo: al-Majlis al-A’la> li’l-Shu’u>n al-Isla>miyyah, 1971), p. 85.
34 Al-Ghazza>li>, al-Iqtis}a>d, p. 43.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., p. 47
37 Fakhr al-Di>n al-Ra>zi>, Muh}assil Afka>r al-Mutaqaddimi>n wa al-Muta’akhiri>n, ed. by
T}a>ha> ‘Abdul Rau>f  Sa’ad (Cairo, Maktabah al-Kulliya>t al-Azhariyyah, nd), p. 194.
38 This is in contrast to the Mu’tazalite position of  relating God’s absolute
power to His divine justice.  See De Boer, Ta>ri>kh al-Falsafah fi> al-Isla>m, translated by Abu
Reydah, (Cairo: Matba’ah Lajnat al-Ta’li>f  wa al-Tarjamah wa al-Nashr, 1938), p. 53.
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is the essence of  the Ash’arite perception of  divine power.  There
have indeed been an attempt by the Ash’arites themselves to escape
from this rigid determinism to the more flexible concept through
adopting the theory of acquisition.39  But this attempt is a total failure.
In advocating this dogma, the Ash’arites found that the world is
not large enough to have two capacities where each of them may operate
in a special area.  In other words, the absolute presence of  God’s power
is possible only in the complete absence of  human’s capacity.40  This
–––––––––––––––––
39 The Ash’arites knew that “in believing that there is no impact for human
capacity on his act, have broken down the demands of divine law”.  See Abu> al-Ma’a>li>
al-Juwayni>, al-Aqi>dah al-Niz}a>miyyah, ed. by Ah}mad H{ija>zi> al-Saqa>, (Cairo: Maktabah al-
Kulliya>t al-Azhariyyah, 1987), p. 44.  In this way they sought to affirm an insignificant
amount of  influence of  man’s capacity on his act.  Hence, al-Ash’ari>’s theory of  acquisition
led to the belief that God is the creator of all acts, and that humans are acquirers of their
acts by means of  contingent capacity created for them.  “God”, in al-Ash’ari>’s view,
“runs His cannon in a way to create human act –if human wants it or is prepared for it-
after or below or with the contingent capacity (which in itself is also created).  This act is
known as acquisition.  It is the creation, innovation and invention of God, and the
acquisition of  human with his created capacity.  See al-Shahrasta>ni>, al-Milal, vol I, p. 97.
Although many attempts have been made to modify and improve this theory so as to
be more acceptable, it is still pregnant with many serious dilemmas, which made it at
the end a coercive theory.  Among these dilemmas are: (1) that human acts remain
forever the creation of God, and (2) that human capacity –accepting that it is the
creation of  God- is nothing but the capacity to act (fi’lun) and not to abstain (tarkun)
from it.  Human capacity is not an original substance in man, but a mere accident added
to him, because accident –according to the Ash’arites- does not remain in two times.
That is to say, human capacity does not last.  It ceases when an act that comes with it
ceases.  See al-Juwayni>, al-Irsha>d, ed. by Muhammad Yu>suf  Mu>sa>, et al (Cairo: Maktabah
al-Khangi>, 1950), p. 217-8.  Thus, human capacity remains a ceased accident vis-à-vis an
absolute and unlimited power.  However, the danger of this dogma becomes apparent
when it (dogma) transcends the religious sphere to the domains of  politics and ideology.
40 The Mu’tazalites –on the contrary- believed that the activity of  God’s power
is not manifested in a reasonable manner except in the shade of a relative presence of
human capacity.  Therefore, they made conditions for human accountability (takli>f),
which is one of  the aspects through which God’s power may be achieved in human
domain, “the necessity of the mukallaf to have the capacity (to perform the obligation)
before the time in which the obligation is put forward upon him so that the performance
of the obligation may become valid in a manner in which he is obliged”.  See al-Qa>di>
‘Abdul Jabba>r, “Kita>b al-Takli>f ”, al-Mughni>, ed. by Muh}ammad ‘Ali al-Najjar et al,
(Cairo: al-Hay’ah al-Mis\riyyah al-A<mah li>’l-Ta’li>f  wa’l-Nashr, 1965), vol XI, p. 367.
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dogma reflects the treatment of human existence as passive and fragile.
And the logical result of that dogma is that any human activity in the
areas of  knowledge and morality is denied.  In truth, it is hard -according
to the Ash’arites- to build any morality within the unadulterated human
limits.  The reason is that, if  the foundation of  moral life lies in the
observation of  moral rule, then this rule -according to the Ash’arites-
cannot be discovered by human mind.  This rule instead, is given by
the divine rule.  Human in his turn must only submit and obey.41  Hence,
the origin of the Ash’arite morality and its goal stems from the divine.
Therefore the Ash’arites completely reject that “human mind can be
the only means of knowing the right and ugly action”.42  That is because
actions in themselves do not contain any specific character or quality
that justifies their morality, i. e., rightness or ugliness.  Actions as such,
are out of the area of moral judgment due to their emptiness of any
moral quality.43  Thus the evaluation of  action’s morality –right or ugly-
is not the area of human mind but it is the prerogative right of God
only.  The moral judgments -like the Ash’arite accidents- are only
something added to action from without.  And if God is the one who
adds accidents to substances and joins them, then “the moral judgment
–––––––––––––––––
41 This is despite the fact that the Ash’arite are able to discover –as the Mu’tazalites
have done partially- the strong relation between the moral rule as God’s given and the
moral rule as human construct.  That is so because if there is a rule given by God, then
God Himself has undeniably implanted in every human a piece of that given rule.  On
this basis, the listening of this inner voice or reason leads to the discovery of the given
commands ordained by God through revelation.  But the Ash’arites –in their loyalty to
the dogma of the absolute power- have not realized anything of morality except a rule
of obedience and submission given by God.  This might explain that morality in our
contemporary consciousness is related to submission and blind obedience, and not to
insight and conscious commitment.
42 Al-Baqilla>ni>, al-Tamhi>d, p. 105.
43 In this regard, al-Shahrasta>ni> gives us an example that “if we assume that
man is created in the state of a complete intuition and perfect mind at once without
behaving himself according to the moral standard of certain people, or without parental
education, or without any knowledge of divine rule and finally without learning from
a teacher, then two things are presented to him that (1) two are more than one, and that
(2) it is bad to lie, undoubtedly he will not be bothered about the first, and will be
about the second”.  See al-Shahrasta>ni>, Nihayat al-Iqda>m fi> ‘Ilm al-Kala>m, ed. by Alfred
Gyum (no place, no publication, no date), p. 352.
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in its turn can only be attached to human action by God’s decree.”44
Rightness –as some of early scholars explained- means “that
which is decreed by God in praising its doer.  Ugliness in the meantime
means that which is decreed by God in vilifying its doer”.45
Just as the relationship between substances and accidents in
physics is external and temporal, so also the relationship between moral
judgments and human actions.  This is to enable God –if  He wills- to
praise what He previously vilified or to vilify what He previously
praised.  On this account, the Asha’rite ethics is based on “the
revelation of  God’s decree”,46 and not on the nature of  human being.
Within this context, the Ash’arite ethics champions the emptiness of
human being and the insignificance of  his affairs.  It negates human
completely for the sake of the divine.
If  it seems difficult for the Asha’rites to establish a moral system
grounded on what is human, then it would equally be difficult for them
to construct an epistemological system based solely on human faculties.
Indeed, they maintain that “thinking which leads to knowledge is
obligatory”,47 but this obligation is not a product of the analysis of
human essence and his rational nature.  It is rather a product of  God’s
command.48  As one of them says, “the condition of the obligation (of
knowledge) is the affirmation of  revelation”.49  Hence, knowledge is
not an essential activity of human being per se, but an activity which,
owes for its very essentiality to the transcendental authority.
–––––––––––––––––
44 Al-Baqilla>ni>, al-Tamhi>d, p. 105.
45 Al-Juwayni>, al-Irsha>d, p. 258.
46 Al-Baqilla>ni>, al-Tamhi>d, p. 114.
47 Al-Juwayni>, al-Irsha>d, p. 8.
48 It has become clear for the Mu’tazalites that rational thinking is necessary for
the affirmation of revelation, and not vice versa.  The Mu’tazlites, addressing the
Ash’arites, say, “if  you negate that the obligation of  thinking is not based on mind,
then that leads to the nullification of the (rational) argumentation of the prophets
against their people.  In fact, whenever the prophets called their people toward their
message, and asked them to think about their miracles, then the people say, “thinking
is not obligatory except through revelation, which is not yet affirmed”.  See al-Juwayni>,
al-Irsha>d, p. 9.
49 Ibid., p. 10.
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To move further, the Ash’arite epistemological disqualification
is not satisfied with confining itself in the notions of rightness and
ugliness of  human actions.  It also extends itself  to the wide range of
what might be termed “necessary knowledge”.  As one of  them claims
“when humans came to the world in a sudden way, they did not have
any knowledge by which they could differentiate between foods and
medicine or killing poisons.  Nor did they have any intuition, which
enables them to know what they need.  Knowledge of this sort cannot
be arrived at by means of reason.50
Deeper analysis of those words reveals that for the Ash’arites,
there is no any role for both reason and experiment in knowledge
because, “knowledge of this kind is not attained through reason, and
that humans in order to know it are in need of divine revelation, and
that their duty is to base the principle of medicine for example, on
revelation and on the tradition of the prophets”.51
There is no doubt from here that knowledge of this sort discloses
the permanent absence of  what is human, and the complete presence
of what is absolute.
Finally, the disqualification of  knowledge within human
conditions is related –in the last analysis- to the nature of the Ash’arite
ontology.  This ontology in fact –so long as it relies on the divine
intervention and the continuous creation of  things at any moment-
does not recognize any kind of knowledge except that which comes
through the divine intervention.  Thus, the Ash’arite system of  thought
moves from a man void of the capacity to know by himself to a world
empty from the possibility to exist by itself.  In this regard, the
impoverishment of both man and world aims to inculcate the absolute
activity of  –again- the divine power.  This takes us to the point that
the Ash’arite system adopts -in the areas of both ethics and knowledge-
the perception of the divine as active only when elements of existence
–notably human and world- are absent.
The pre-dominance of  the absolutist structure of  the Asha’rite
system, which is manifested in the complete obliteration of human
–––––––––––––––––
50 Al-Baqilla>ni>, al-Tamhi>d, p. 127.
51 Ibid., p. 129.
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capacity for the sake of the absolute power of Lord, becomes apparent
especially when any issue of reality is dealt with.  If some argue that
the issue of human affairs such as the pricing of goods for example, is
not debatable because the prices are determined by the changing
conditions of man (this is the view of the Mu’tazilites),52 the Ash’arites
believe that “price is linked to what is beyond human choice”.53  They
maintain that the changing price –be it higher or lower- is “God’s act
because it is He who creates the desires of people to buy (or not to
buy) and provides circumstances for monopoly.  Thus, the scarcity or
the abundance of goods does not condition price.  Price is conditioned
by God, who has made creatures to have a need for foods, and foods
are useless and unthinkable without this created need”.54  Hence, the
Asha’rite determinism reaches its extreme in the negation of  human
capacity even in issues that cannot be thought of without the active
presence of  man in history.55
The Ash’arite denial of human capacity for the sake of the
absolutization of  Lord’s power had resulted –in the areas of  some
fundamental issues such as the pre-determined time for death (a>ja>l)
and provision (rizq)- in religious and moral offences.  As regard to the
issue of ajal, the Ash’arites asserted that, “whoever is killed, has indeed
died according to his pre-determined time (ajal).  This means that
whosoever is killed, his death is being known by God eternally, and
that which has been known by His eternal knowledge must inevitably
happen”.56  Undoubtedly, the Ash’arites in considering that the murdered
is dead according to his pre-determined time, attempted to avoid
recognizing any activity of any power other than that of the absolute
divine power.
–––––––––––––––––
52 Al-Juwayni>, al-Irsha>d, p. 367.
53 Ibid.
54 Al-Baqilla>ni>, al-Tamhi>d, p. 330.
55 It seems that the Ash’arite emphasis on this metaphysical and unworldly
aspect on the issue of price has a direct implication on the apparent justification –on the
social level- of the monopolistic and exploitative trend, which accumulates as more
profit as possible by bringing the issue of price into the grip of the unknown power on
which man has no power whatsoever.
56 Al-Juwayni>, al-Irsha>d, p. 362.
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The Mu’tazilites on the other hand, argue that if  that is truly the
case then “one whose reason is sound, would not see that there is any
role of the murderer in killing the murdered, because what the Ash’arites
say (concerning the ajal) implies that the real murderer of the murdered
is the Lord of the world (God)”.57  On this ground therefore, one may
see that -according to the Ash’arites- a moral or judgmental
responsibility of the murderer in his murder is being dropped.
The Ash’arite position that “the murdered is dead according to
his pre-determined time”, may also be seen as sacrificing the original
content of some religious texts and legal judgments, especially
concerning death penalty for the murderer.  That is to say, if  death
penalty for the murderer comes under the general rule of  “soul for
soul”, this means that death penalty is “to take the murderer’s soul off
his body just as he took the soul of  the murdered off  his body.  And if
what the Ash’arites say is true –that the murdered is dead because of
his pre-determined time- then “in court for example, the judges can
only sentence the murderer by wounding him and then release him
afterward without sentencing him to death, and leaving him to wait
his pre-determined death.  In truth, God does not mean what the
Ash’arites mean.  Instead, He –as the Qur’an indicates- wants the judges
to take the murderer’s soul off  his body just as he took the soul of  the
murdered off  his body, and kill him as a punishment of  his deed”.58
Thus, death penalty for the murderer means that the murdered is not
dead by God’s pre-determined decree, but because of  the deed of  the
murderer.  It means that in murder there is an active role of  the murderer
as opposed to the role of  the absolute divine power.
Apart from this religious and legal argumentation, the Mu’tazilites
also presented a logical evidence against the Ash’arites who negate
human role in death by murder.  They say that the Asha’rite position
concerning God’s role in the death of  all people in all cases raises the
question of a person who committed suicide.  “Did such a person
indeed kill himself  while still having his soul in his body, or did he die
–––––––––––––––––
57 Yah}ya> b. al-H{usayn, “al-Radd wa al-Ih}tija>j ‘ala> al-H{asan b. Muh}ammad b. al-
H{anafiyyah”, in Muh}ammad Ima>rah (ed.), Rasa>’il al-‘Adl wa’l-Tawh}i>d, (Cairo: Da>r al-
Hila>l, 1971), vol II, p. 162.
58 Ibid., p. 163.
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because of  his time to die, which has been pre-determined by God,
has come at the time of his suicide?  If they said that such a person
murdered himself  while still having his soul in his body, then they
acknowledged that the self-murderer is responsible for his own act.
But if they said that he killed himself after the coming of his pre-
determined time, then it is unacceptable because any person whose
pre-determined time to die has come is dead and therefore unable to
kill himself.  That is, it is impossible for a dead to commit a murder”.59
Thus, the Ash’arite dogma of  pre-determined death suffers from moral,
religious and logical defects, and necessitates that we attribute the
role of murder in man and not in God.
With regard to the issue of provisions (arza>q), the negation by
the Ash’arites of human capacity for the sake of the absolute divine
power means that “whoever ate or drank something for example, has
done so from the provision of his own, be that provision is religiously
permissible or not”.60  If  the Ash’arites say that, “when a person steals
something to eat, he may be said to have eaten the provision of another
person”,61 then it means that they affirm the capacity of  human to
steal.  But they also often say that, “everything that one steals from
other, is a provision for him from God”.62  All this means that (1)
human being has the capacity to steal.  (2) God “feeds and provides
those who steal, but condemns these provisions as religiously prohibited
(h}ara>m), then proceeds to punish the thieves for their acceptance of
what He provides, and keeps them away from taking His reward.  This
is an aggression against God the All-merciful, and attributing Him as
unjust and unfair”.63  Hence, the Ash’arite denial of human capacity
results in the negation of divine justice.
What this aggression ultimately necessitates is that human acts
must rather be seen as the product of his own choice and that he has
the capacity to do things in order that God may be purified from the
–––––––––––––––––
59 Ibid., p. 166.
60 Abdul Qa>hir al-Baghda>di>, Usu>l al-Di>n, (Istanbul: Matba’ah al-Daulah, 1928),
p. 144.
61 Ibid.
62 Yahya b. al-Husayn, “al-Rad wa al-Ihtija>j”, p. 172.
63 Ibid., p. 170.
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accusation of  being unjust.  In truth, in affirming human capacity as
necessary for his own acts lies an affirmation of  divine power in a way
more logical and more just.
D. Absolutism: From Anthropology to Ontology
If  the absolutist structure of  the Ash’arites’ system of  thought
appeared clearly in their investigations of human issues, its appearance
in their investigations of  ontological issues is even more clearer.  In
other words, while this absolutist structure is apparent in human issues
-in the total negation of human capacity and in the unlimited
absolutization of divine power- it becomes more apparent ontologically
in the total negation of the productivity of nature.
Speaking generally, the Asha’rites negate any independence or
objective natural laws which regulate all natural events in the world.
Every natural event –according to them- is categorized as possible
governed not by natural law but by divine power, which “encompasses
not some of the possible beings as the Mu’tazilites claimed, but all of
them”.64  In truth, the reliance of  the natural events on the divine
power reaches a point of abstract generality that it is not possible to
indicate at any movement in the cosmos except within the events,
which come about under the impact of  this comprehensive power.
That is because –according to the Asha’rites- belief  in an objective
and constant law regulating the natural events is at odds with the
completeness of  divine power, its continuous intervention in nature,
and its inclusiveness of “all possible and innovated things among the
celestial and terrestrial beings, as well as the essences and attributes”.65
All this reveals that the Ash’arites did not hesitate to break down the
system of nature on the one hand, and that there is an essential and
intrinsic correlation between the Ash’arite view of nature and the
absolutist structure of  their system, on the other.
Interestingly, the Ash’arite teaching about nature was not
grounded in the aspiration to know and rule the nature, but in the
–––––––––––––––––
64 Kama>l al-Di>n Ah}mad al-H{anafi, Isha>ra>t al-Mura>m min ‘Iba>da>t al-Ima>m, ed. by
Yu>suf  ‘Abdul Ra>ziq, (Cairo: T}aba>’at al-H{ilbi>, 1949), p. 133.
65 Ibid.
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tendency to display the principles of the Ash’arite dogma.  “The
(Ash’arite) theologians”, it is said, “wanted to display the impact of
the divine power in its most important subject, which is the cosmos,
after the absolute active impact of this power upon the human existence
has been affirmed.  That is why, there is no need for the Muslims to
understand and interpret the natural phenomenon, except in a way
that supports the belief that it is the sole product of God, and not that
of  nature”.66  Hence, nature in the Asha’rite system of  thought functions
only to “assist human reason to discover God and explaining His
reality”.67
In fact, the Asha’rite position in reducing the natural world to
indivisible parts is a prelude to the affirmation of  the finite things
being under the universal knowledge and absolute power of God.  The
Ash’arite argument goes that “comprehensive knowledge is not possible
except with the finite things, and finite things are not imaginable except
when they are divided as indivisible part”.68  On the other hand, the
Asha’rite view about the accidents (al-a’ra>d) being incapable of  existing
twice intends clearly to accentuate the unique and prerogative right of
divine power to act in the natural world.  To say that nature can exist
twice would lead the Ash’arites to the contradictory premise that
“nature is active and that its act is everlasting”.69
Thus the Ash’arite investigations of natural issues were dyed by
a solid dogmatic trait; a trait that made the Ash’arite natural principles
a matter of acceptance and submission, and not thinking and criticism.
From here, one of the staunch Ash’arites like al-Baghda>di>, saw in al-
Nazza>m al-Mu’tazilite’s criticism of  the indivisible part a reason for
his accusation as an infidel.70  Every contemplation on nature which
aims to achieve an objective explanation of natural issues, and not
merely a teleological justification of them, is unacceptable according
to the Ash’arites.  For them, teleology –or divine manifestation- and
–––––––––––––––––
66 De Boer, Ta>ri>kh al-Falsafah, p. 68.
67 Muh}ammad A<bid al-Ja>biri>, Takwi>n al-Aql al-‘Arabi>, (Beirut, Da>r al-T}ali>’ah,
1984), p. 29.
68 Ali> Sa>mi> al-Nasha>r, Nash’at al-Fikr, vol I, p. 273.
69 Ibid., p. 477.
70 Al-Baghda>di>, al-Farq Bayn al-Firaq, (Beirut: Da>r al-A<fa>q al-Jadi>dah, 1973), p. 316.
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not understanding –or scientific discovery- is the end of their
contemplation on natural issues.  At this point, nature is not an
independent phenomenon understandable within its own boundaries.71
It is rather an imperfect and fragile entity that cannot be explained
except in a way that treats it as a mere manifestation of an absolute
power.  Thus, the Ash’arites propagate a perception of  natural world
as based on separation and division.  Natural world then, needs a
continuous assistance and intervention from without; a view which
once again accentuates the absolute, dominating and intervening power
at the expense of  the uniformed and constant natural law.
Fragmentation and emptiness appear clearly in the Ash’arite
perception of the natural world especially when this world is
understood as, “a mass of separated parts in a way that one of these
parts does not have anything to do with the other”.72  Natural world
accordingly suffers –all the way- from imperfection, degeneration, and
stagnation.  And all this cannot be uplifted except through the
intervention of  the absolute power that joins one part to another and
creates the act of  all parts.  Substances and accidents then, are the
components of  the natural world for the Ash’arites.  They are the “two
categories through which we can conceive the realized things in the
–––––––––––––––––
71 In fact, the Ash’arite perception of nature is consistent with the ancient
perception of it, which always runs parallel to the metaphysical principles of a system in
whose perspective nature is understood.  From here comes the difference of the
understanding of nature in accordance to the difference of the metaphysical systems.
From here too comes the difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian
understandings of nature on the one hand, and the difference between the Ash’arite
and Farabian understanding of it on the other.  On this premise, the Ash’arites have
never been –as some have assumed- “excellent pioneers of modern science”.  See Ali>
Sa>mi> al-Nasha>r, Mana>hij al-Bah}th, p. 127.  All this because the epistemological structure
of the Ash’arite science –if any- agrees with the structure of the ancient science, both
being the product of certain metaphysical assumptions.  Although a contemporary
scientific theory necessitates –for the purpose of interpretation and understanding- an
assumption of metaphysical premises, one cannot argue that there is a substantive
difference between the metaphysical assumptions, which –for its acceptance- requires
certain perception of nature, and between nature, which –for its understanding- requires
certain metaphysical assumption.
72 De Boer, Ta>ri>kh al-Falsafah, p. 70.
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natural world”.73  In spite of the philosophical echo of the two
categories however, they contain –according to the Ash’arites- some
implications, which are different from the implications that the
philosophers understood.  If substance according to the philosophers
is “the self-constituent and self-concretized thing by its essence”,74
then according to the Ash’arites thing cannot exist –or concretize- due
to itself, because everything exist and concretize due to God.  Therefore,
substance according to them is the ultimate end of  body’s division, or
it is -to be more precise- the indivisible part of  body.  Undoubtedly, “if
substances or bodies do not exist due to themselves, then there is
enough space for the direct intervention of  divine power, not only to
create things ex nihilo but also to combine, merge and gather substances
and parts, or to separate and divide them”.75
On the other hand, the perception that substance cannot be self-
constituent leads to the premise that the unity or existence of body is
an external and artificial phenomenon.  By this virtue, body becomes a
subject of eradication and demise, since it is empty from any internal
basis for its unity and existence.  Here the absolute divine power appears
once again as the one who preserves the unity and existence of  body.
Now, the belief  that substance does not have the ability to self-
concretization or self-constituency yields ultimately to the ontological
problem of  the world’s persistence (baqa>) in existence.  It is not possible
to imagine the world in existence as persistent by itself in the light of
what has been said concerning substance, which cannot be self-
constituent.  The perception that substance is not self-constituent means
that, “substances do not persist in existence due to themselves but
due to something else added to them by God”;76 something, which
–––––––––––––––––
73 Ibid., p. 68.
74 Majma al-Lughah al-Arabiyyah, “al-Mu’jam al-Falsafi>”, Jawhar (Cairo: no
publisher, 1979), p. 64.
75 Ahmad Mah}mu>d S}ubh}i>, Fi> Ilm al-Kala>m, p. 213.
76 Harvy A. Walfson, The Philosophy of  Kalam (Harvard: Harvard University
Press, 1976), p. 526.  In our inquiry about the notion of  the eternity of  substance and
accident, we rely in fact on this book.  This is because in our view, this book contains the
most acute and comprehensive treatment about the issue in hand.
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God creates so that substances can persist in existence every moment.77
On that note, substance does not have a real existence.  It has rather
an external, fragile and superficial existence added to them by God
every moment.  Similarly, on that same note, the world does not have
a real existence.  It has rather a superficial and empty existence based
on the continuous creation of God.  The concept that the Ash’arites
propagate concerning substance therefore, leads to the perception that
the world exists in a superficial and unreal way.  Its existence -like
human act- is metaphorical and unreal.  Both exist only insofar as God
wants them to exist through His creation.
Up to this point, it has become clear that the Ash’arite perception
of substance is essentially linked to the intention of paving the way
for the dominance of  divine power, which creates and preserves
creatures in existence.  It may equally have become clear that their
perception of accident displays the activity of this divine power in a
more universal and apparent way.  In fact, the Ash’arites believe that
accidents are “attributes that appear in bodies and substances, and
disappear at the second time of their existence”.78  According to this
definition, accident is a kind of existence destined for disappearance
and demise.79  Having said that, this definition is likely linked to the
Qur’an as its origin as well as to the Ash’arites’ perception of time.
Time, they maintain “ends to indivisible parts or timeless moments,
like bodies”.80  Time therefore, is “a sum total of separated moments
–––––––––––––––––
77 In fact, the idea of persistence itself becomes subsequently a “thing” like
accident which exists in something else.  See Ibid., p. 524.  Because the persistence of
accidents –according to the Ash’arites- cannot be perceived, this persistence –which is
accident- cannot be perceived except through another persistence.  And the rule of the
second persistence is just like the rule of the first one ad infinitum.  Hence, the logical
crisis -in which the Ash’arites stuck themselves in- and which is manifested in the no-
end circle (tasalsul) ad infinitum, must be seen as the natural result of their negation of
the self-constituency of substance, and therefore of the creativity of nature.
78 Al-Baqilla>ni>, al-Tamhi>d, p. 18.
79 The Ash’arites found in the Qur’an bases for their definition of accident as
destined to disappearance and demise.  The Qur’an says, “You want the accident (‘arad)
of the world, and God wants the hereafter (a>khirah) (8/67)”.  It also says, “They say:
this (disappearing) cloud is falling unto us as a rain” (46/24).
80 De Boer, Ta>ri>kh al-Falsafah, p. 70.
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or atoms, each takes place after the other without any affinity between
them”.81  The part (or atom) of time –it follows- is considered an
independent unit without any relation with the part that comes before
or after it.  That is why, the Ash’arites treated time as separated atoms,
and not joined moments.  Undoubtedly, this perception of  time
conduces necessarily to the assumption of emptiness or non-existence
among these separated points.  Emptiness or non-existence in other
words, stands in between the two of  the Ash’arite time of  atoms.82
From here it is not possible for accident to exist in two times, because
there is between one part of time and another, a gap which must impose
itself upon the accident.  What is noteworthy is that, the Ash’arite
analysis of time presumably ended up in the logical induction of the
nihilistic aspect of  accident –and subsequently of  substance too.  That
is, the Ash’arites perceived that non-existence –of both accidents and
substances- is a logical necessity, and not an act of  divine activity.
–––––––––––––––––
81 Ali> Sa>mi> al-Nasha>r, Nash’at al-Fikr, vol I, p. 475.
82 The Ash’arites attempted to transcend this metaphysical crisis by saying that
time jumps from one moment to another.  But it seems that this metaphysical solution
as it were, leads to an ideological crisis.  In fact, time is based upon the idea of “jump”;
that is a cancellation of any relationship –be it necessary or logical- between the past
moment and the next one because of  which the notion of  man’s progress may be said
to loose its basis and meaning.  Accordingly, this physical assumption of  time –on the
ideological level- leads to the impossibility of the emergence of consciousness in its
historical form, because this consciousness is based essentially on the necessity of the
continuity of historical moments in a way that an horizon for the attainment of
historical experience may be opened up.  This is a raw material of  historical consciousness.
And because progress is particularly possible through the emergence of consciousness
in its historical form, this idea of progress in a contemporary Arabic and Islamic discourse
is characterized by a great amount of  uncertainty and ambiguity.  That is because progress
is not a product of historical experience and consciousness, but a jump from one
moment to another in history; a moment which is possibly borrowed from its past-
self (bygone traditionalism) or from its present-other (contemporary traditionalism).
However, both traditionalism agree that progress is a jump from one moment in
history to another without an intensive analysis of a current historical situation.  And
it is from here that both views gain their traditionalism at once and at the same time.
Finally, the hegemony of  the Ash’arite system whose structure is centered around the
idea of elimination and not assimilation, made progress in our contemporary discourse
a negation of  a moment in history for the sake of  another, or at best, a preservation of
both moments together in an artificial co-existence.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008 M/1429 H 27
The Ash ‘arite Dogma: the Root of the Arab/Muslim Absolutism
This undoubtedly, is linked to the Ash’arite teaching that divine power
is related to creation and not to non-existence because, “the non-
existence of events –be they substances or accidents- take place due
to themselves, and not due to divine power since the effect of that
power is only existential.  Hence, divine power is not related to non-
existence”.83  And because the Ash’arites assume that “the world needs
not a creator in the case of  having existed due to itself ”,84 it follows
consequently that “the continuous creation” of  God must be affirmed,
since “the reason for the need of the creator is creation”.85  But
interestingly, continuous creation is not possible except through the
affirmation of  the continuous nihilisation that takes place prior to the
continuous creation.  In this whole scenario, the Ash’arites were forced
to bring non-existence into the world’s entity as a logical necessity and
not as an act of  divine activity in order that God’s act does not appear
absurd.  Nonetheless, the fact remains that this non-existence is
considered -in the Ash’arite ontology- simply as a prelude to the
affirmation of  divine activity, and not as a reflection of  the evolutionary
nature of existence as in Hegel.
In truth, the belief  in the continuous creation was the most
important result that the idea of  the world’s non-existence has produced.
The reason being that when an accident turns to be non-existent,
another accident must be recreated otherwise the world will cease to
exist.  And if the non-existence of the accident is self-caused, its
recreation and appearance at certain time is not –in contrast- self-
caused.  Nor is it –as philosophers assume- caused by “a sequence (of
reasons) which necessitates its appearance at certain time”.86  This
appearance of accident is rather caused by “the All-mighty God, who
determines by His will the time of  creating the accident as it is possible
for Him to create the accident before the time of its creation
(determined by Him) or after it”.87  Furthermore, according to the
–––––––––––––––––
83 Muh}ammad Nawawi> b. ‘Umar al-Ja>wi>, Sharh} al-Dur al-Fari>d fi> ‘Aqa>’id Ahl al-
Tawh}i>d, last edition, (Cairo: Maktabah al-H{alabi>,1954), p. 21.
84 Al-Sayyid al-Sanad, Sharh} al-Mawa>qif, (Cairo, Mat\ba’at al-Bu>’la>q, 1266 H), p. 199.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
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Ash’arites there is no any slightest influence in the creation of accidents,
as they are created merely by His Will without any observation to the
requirements of law and wisdom.  It goes without saying therefore,
that the continuous creation of accidents is linked to substances and
to the whole existence because to think of the demise of accident
without the nullification of substance is not possible.  Substance is
nullified when accident becomes non-existent.  From here, if accident
cannot persist in existence for two times, “substances similarly, cannot
persist in existence for two times for substances are just like accidents
in this regard”.88  The logical sleight of hand in this whole argument is
that, because the demise of accident causes the nullification of
substance, the persistence of substance in turn requires by necessity
the recreation by God of  accident.  Tu put it differently, the recreation
of  accident is the cause of  substance’s persistence in existence.  As
the Ash’arites maintain, “accident is the condition for the persistence
of substance in existence.  And since the existence of accident is
constantly renewed, recreated and is in need of cause, substance is
also in need of that cause -in order that it can exist- through the
mediation of the cause needed by its condition, which is accident”.89
This means that the continuous creation of accident is the continuous
creation of  substance too.
Thus, the resultant typology of  the Ash’arite analysis about
existence leads to the premise that the most simple element in existence
is unable to continue to persist except by “relying at all times and in all
conditions upon the divine intervention”.90  It follows that the natural
world does not enjoy any productivity or subjective activity.  Indeed,
in some cases the Ash’arites believe that accident –and therefore
substance- may be active and productive without any intervention from
without.  But they say this only –and only- in connection to the demise
and nullification of  accident.  That is to say, accident is only active for
its own demise and nullification, while for its existence and persistence
it remains in need of  divine activity.  The perception that nature is
passive and dead –as the Ash’arites propagate- finds its endorsement
–––––––––––––––––
88 De Boer, Ta>ri>kh al-Falsafah, p. 71.
89 Al-Sayyid al-Sanad, Sharh} al-Mawa>qif, p. 199.
90 Ali> Sa>mi> al-Nasha>r, Nash’at al-Fikr, vol I, p. 476.
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and explanation in their perception of divine absolute power as the
only active player in the world.
To continue, if  the belief  in the continuous creation of  the world
has become –in the Ash’arite ontology- something necessary for the
explanation of the extension of the world into existence, it is equally
necessary –within their epistemological theory- for the explanation of
the possibility of  this world to be known.  That is to say, the divine
guaranty for the existence of the world is necessary so that this existence
can be known.  That is because, the continuous creation of the world
does not mean –according to the Ash’arites- a continuous preservation
of that world with one act of God, but it means an endless process of
creation and recreation of  the world by God’s renewal act in every
moment.  Accordingly, existence is not a property of  one and constant
world even though God through His act wills so, but to sequences of
infinite worlds.  Although, the same world is created every moment, it
is not one world, “but a sequence of worlds succeeding one another to
the extent that they seem to us –through this succession- as if they are
one world”.91  Undoubtedly, such a world –void of  steadiness and
necessity- is the one, which is not possible to be known for certain
except through the transcendental intervention.92  So the ontology,
which is guaranteed by divine intervention gives birth –on the level of
–––––––––––––––––
91 De Boer, Ta>ri>kh al-Falsafah, p. 71.
92 In fact this kind of assumption seems to be the inevitable result of any theory
about existence which sacrifices the objectivity of the world for the sake of the absolute.
It is well-known that the Sophist tendency –especially that which is represented by
Gorgias- has come to an extreme agnostic conclusion about the possibility of knowing
the world.  And that was after its successful destruction of the objectivity of the world
for the sake of man, who –under certain circumstances- became an absolute to whom
everything must be measured.  The Ash’arites in their turn, -had they not found a
guarantee in the absolute- would have come to the same agnostic conclusion after
having dislodged the world of its steadiness and necessity for the sake of the absolute
power.  The possibility of human knowledge therefore, remains essentially linked to
the theory of existence on the one hand, and to the possible relationship between its
three circles (God, the world and man) on the other.  A more balanced relationship
between these three circles however, leads to the affirmation of the possibility of
human knowledge, while knowledge under the dominance of the transcendental
conditions is not possible except through the transcendental intervention.
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knowledge- to an epistemology guaranteed by the divine.93  It means
that if  divine intervention is an ontological necessity, then it is also an
epistemological demand.  And it is this particular issue that displays
the Ash’arite negation of the activity of both world and man, and the
accentuation of the absolute divine essence as the sole power in
existence.
Now, if  the absolutist structure of  the Ash’arite system is
manifested in an apparent way in our examination of the elements of
the natural world, it is equally manifested clearly in our analysis of the
relationships between these elements.  In other words, “if  substance
cannot be separated from accident”, and “accident cannot exist without
substance”94 since accident does not stand in existence by itself, and
does not stand in another accident,95 then the relationship between
substance and accident is not regulated by any totality or universality.
That is because certain accident is related to a certain substance, in a
way that “it cannot in itself  be related to another substance”.96  To
give an example, “a blackness which is related to its particular location
is not at all the same blackness of other location”.97  On this basis
there is no total meaning or category that includes more than one
substance or one part among parts present outside, because all parts
are caught in the grip of an absolute power that joins or separates
them.  Thus, the absoluteness of  the dominant structure of  the
Ash’arites’ system becomes apparent in their investigation of nature.
–––––––––––––––––
93 In fact, epistemological concepts of certain system in most cases run parallel
to the ontological concepts included within that system.  That is because of the fact that
the two concepts belong to a certain structure around which that system revolves.
From here the essentiality of the connection between the epistemological concept and
ontological perception ensues in a way that the ontology –being in itself self-dependent-
conduces to self-dependent epistemology.  It is from here that a philosopher like
Descartes needed –in order to jump outside the solitude of his own ego- to a “Lord”,
who guarantees the truth of his knowledge of existence, or even the very persistence of
that existence.  Similarly, the Ash’arites –apart from not having a comprehensive theory
of knowledge- have nonetheless ontological perceptions, which would have led to an
epistemological formulation of the same nature like that of Descartes’.
94 De Boer, Ta>ri>kh al-Falsafah, p. 69.
95 Al-Baghda>di>, al-Farq, p. 317, and al-Sayyid al-Sanad, Sharh} al-Mawa>qif, p. 197.
96 Ali> Sa>mi> al-Nasha>r, Nash’at al-Fikr, vol I, p. 475.
97 Al-Sayyid al-Sanad, Sharh} al-Mawa>qif, p. 202.
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Finally, it might have become clear from this that there is a
structure that regulates the elements of  the Ash’arite investigation of
the issues relating to the divine, human, and the natural world.  It is
indeed possible to formulate a comprehensive system capable of
binding all these issues together despite their apparent differences; a
system, which finds its explanation only –and only- in its affiliation
with the absolutistic structure.  Indeed, this structure is absolutistic
because it pre-imposes the presence and activity of the divine in an
absolute way, at the expense of  the marginality and passivity of  human
and nature.
Final marks must be made.  The absolutist structure of  the
Ash’arites’ teaching is linked admittedly to their incapability of realizing
the content of the relationship between the three cycles (God, human,
and the world) in an interactive and assimilative way, as opposed to a
dominating and exclusive manner.  This means that the world according
to the Ash’arites has only one side that dominates and eliminates others.
And in addition to the theoretical aspects that this structure has, the
fact that this structure reflects the vision about the real world is
something undeniable.  That is to say, it is not possible to isolate this
formulation of  the absolutist structure from the social and political
views of  the Ash’arites.  It has been proven so far that the Ash’arites
have a system, which revolves around a certain structure of  specific
characters and which dictates all their theological issues.  It follows
that the task of any sub-inquiry upon an Ash’arite particular issue can
only be confined to that which discovers the presence of the total
structure within this specific issue; an issue that must be relegated
under a total system that bestows upon it its rationality and explanation.
So, it is necessary to remove the partiality of  any particular issue and -
on the ground that science is essentially linked to the total and not to
the particular- put that particular issue under the umbrella of the total
system so that it may become a scientific issue.  It goes without saying
at the end, that an investigation of any particular issue –such as
prophecy- is accordingly, a negation of  its particularity.  That is because
it is –in depth- an attempt to place that particular issue under the dictate
of the total system, which bestows upon it its rationality and
explanation.
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2008 M/1429 H
Ali Mabrook
32
E. Conclusion
This investigation does not only aim to bring the partial and
fragmented Ash’arite issues under the umbrella of the concept of
discourse, but also aims to interrogate and ultimately to control
absolutism, which employs the theological rhetoric to veil its ideological
content.  The line of argument that the essay follows is that, in its
employment of the theological rhetoric, absolutism aspires –in addition
to the concealment of its ideological content- the attempt to ascend
itself to the world of sacredness in order that it may become immune
of any criticism and unquestionable in its perpetuating domination.
The essay would suggest that the only way to get out of  the
crisis that the Arab/Muslim world faces is to replace the tradition of
absolutism with the culture of  consciousness.  This means that any
attempt to reform and change must start from the deconstruction of
the Arab and Muslim mind/discourse, and not from the critique of
their practice and politics only.  Apart from this suggested attempt, it
is not ironical that absolutism would reproduce itself under the masks
of  the Western –or even Muslim- initiatives of  reform and change.
But this does not mean that the political reform must be postponed
until the intellectual deconstruction is achieved.  The works of  the
politicians in their political reform must be accompanied by the efforts
of  the intellectuals in their deconstruction of  the mind and discourse
of  the Arabs and the Muslims.
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